RUSSIAN NATIONALISM AS MAIN PILAR OF PUTIN’S REGIME
Russian Nationalism: From Soviet Tool to Pillar of Putinism
By Gustavo de Arístegui
I. Introduction: From Stalin’s Shadow to Neo-Imperialist Nationalism
On May 28, 2025, The New York Times reported the unveiling of an imposing statue of Joseph Stalin in Moscow’s iconic Kurskaya metro station. Far from a mere anecdote or nostalgic revisionism, this event serves as an eloquent preface to the complex narrative of contemporary Russia—a nation where the shadows of its Soviet past, far from dissipating, are selectively invoked to fortify the edifice of the present. The effigy of the Georgian dictator, under whose iron grip Russian nationalism was brutally harnessed to galvanize the state in times of war and peace, reemerges not as a tribute to communism—an ideology formally extinct—but as a nod to autocracy, nostalgia for a lost empire, and a particular vision of Russian grandeur.
This act is the tip of a deeper phenomenon: the progressive and inexorable absorption of Russian identity and nationalism as the unifying core and vector of power, first within the Soviet project and now, with renewed vigor, in Vladimir Putin’s Russia. The Russian Federation, formally democratic and post-communist, has reembraced this ideological matrix, replacing the brutal Marxist-Leninist repressive machinery with a cult of essentialist, authoritarian, and markedly revanchist national identity. As Putin himself declared years ago, in words that resonate more powerfully today: “The collapse of the Soviet Union was the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the 20th century.” This statement, as historian Anne Applebaum notes in The Atlantic (2022), reveals not just imperial nostalgia but the definitive fusion of Russian nationalism with the authoritarian praxis of the post-communist state—a continuity underscored by Stalin’s reappearance in Moscow’s public spaces, as highlighted by global media.
II. The USSR as a Russian Empire Disguised as Internationalism
The Foundational Lie: Federal Equality and Muscovite Centralism The Soviet Union’s constitutional framework solemnly proclaimed the formal sovereignty of each federated republic, even recognizing their theoretical right to secession. In practice, however, this elaborate legal construct was a mirage. The Communist Party of the Soviet Union (PCUS) operated as a rigidly centralized structure, dominated not only by ethnic Russians in its highest echelons but also by an unyielding logic of vertical subordination to Moscow. Rusification, often subtle but always persistent, manifested in multiple dimensions:
The imposition of the Russian language as the indispensable lingua franca for administration, higher education, and social or professional advancement across the Union.
The promotion of Russian historical narratives, with their heroes and foundational myths, as the backbone of the official Soviet story, often subsuming or marginalizing the national histories of other republics.
A disdain, sometimes implicit and sometimes overt, for non-Russian peripheral cultures, often relegated to folklore or, worse, branded as vestiges of “bourgeois nationalism” to be eradicated.
Policies of demographic colonization, implemented through forced population transfers and planned settlements of ethnic Russians in strategic regions of non-Russian republics, disrupting ancestral balances.
As historian Orlando Figes observes in A People’s Tragedy (1996), “The Soviet state, while preaching equality, was in practice a Russian empire dressed in ideological garb, with Moscow as its unassailable center.”
From “Friendship of Peoples” to Chauvinism Masquerading as Internationalism The concept of the “friendship of peoples” was a cornerstone of Soviet propaganda, but this proclaimed fraternity masked an implicit hierarchy. The definitive turning point came during World War II, rebranded by official historiography as the “Great Patriotic War.” Facing the Third Reich’s onslaught, Stalin sidelined internationalist dogmas to appeal directly to visceral Russian patriotism. The war was fought not primarily in the name of global communism but as a heroic Russian epic, evoking the military feats of the Tsarist era. Figures like Alexander Nevsky and Dmitry Donskoy were resurrected, and St. George seemed to rise again under the red banner.
Concurrently, policies toward other nationalities hardened. Institutional antisemitism, though veiled, persisted; republics with strong national identities, such as Georgia, Armenia, the Baltic states, and, crucially, Ukraine, saw their distinctiveness systematically repressed. Any hint of national autonomy beyond tolerated limits was branded as bourgeois deviation and crushed without hesitation. As political scientist Francis Fukuyama argues in Identity (2018), “The Soviet Union’s universalist rhetoric was a veneer for a Russian-dominated hierarchy, where the ‘elder brother’ Russian dictated the terms.” What prevailed was not communism in its theoretical purity but a form of national-Bolshevism with an unmistakably Slavic face.
III. From Yeltsin to Putin: End of Communism or Continuity of Imperialism?
The Lost Decade and the Revenge of the Siloviki The implosion of the USSR in 1991 plunged millions of Russians into shock. For many, it represented not just a geopolitical humiliation of historic proportions but a profound ontological collapse—a loss of identity and national pride. The chaotic 1990s, marked by a devastating economic crisis, rampant oligarchic corruption, and Russia’s visible decline on the global stage, created fertile ground for resentment and nostalgia for lost grandeur and order. This vacuum was deftly exploited by an emerging elite: the siloviki, individuals primarily from the former state security structures (KGB, GRU) and the military. These figures did not necessarily yearn for Marxist-Leninist ideology but craved the restoration of vertical power, state discipline, and, above all, lost imperial pride.
Vladimir Putin emerged as the perfect embodiment of these aspirations: a KGB officer with a pragmatic, Darwinian view of international politics, promising order and the restoration of Russian greatness. Under his iron leadership, the nascent democratic shoots of the Yeltsin era were erased without hesitation, and a new official narrative took hold, selectively blending:
The most presentable aspects of Soviet glory (the victory at Stalingrad, Yuri Gagarin’s spaceflight, the triumph over Nazism).
An ethnic pan-Russian nationalism emphasizing the unity of Eastern Slavic peoples under Moscow’s aegis.
Orthodox Christianity, revived as a moral and spiritual pillar of the state and Russian identity.
A pronounced desire for geopolitical revenge against a West perceived as expansionist and hostile.
As journalist Masha Gessen writes in The Future Is History (2017), “Putin’s Russia is less a revival of Soviet ideology than a reassertion of imperial ambition cloaked in nationalist fervor, drawing on the myths and symbols of a glorified past.”
Putinism and Russian Nationalism as a Substitute for Soviet Communism The political system consolidated under Putin, often termed “Putinism,” has shown remarkable skill in recycling Soviet mechanisms of control and social cohesion, stripped of their communist veneer. The planned economy gave way to state capitalism with strong clientelist undertones, but the FSB (KGB’s successor) expanded its influence; presidentialism morphed into personalized autocracy; the media was progressively aligned with the official narrative, and dissent was systematically persecuted or neutralized.
The fundamental difference lies in the open embrace of assertive Russian nationalism, no longer cloaked in proletarian internationalism. Putinism posits that Russia is not merely a nation-state but a singular “civilization” with a unique historical destiny. In this worldview, former Soviet republics, especially Ukraine, are seen as inseparable parts of Russia’s natural sphere of influence—the so-called “Russian World” (Russkiy Mir). As scholar Timothy Snyder notes in The Road to Unfreedom (2018), “Putin’s vision of Russia as a civilizational empire rejects the sovereignty of neighboring states, treating them as extensions of Moscow’s will.”
IV. The Soviet Colonial Legacy: Federated Republics as Colonized Subjects
The acute tensions between contemporary Russia and Ukraine, Georgia, Moldova, the Baltic states, and even Central Asian republics like Kazakhstan cannot be fully understood without examining the intrinsically imperial structure of the Soviet state. The USSR’s vaunted federalism concealed a colonial relationship between the Muscovite center and non-Russian peripheries, sustained by:
The systematic plundering of the republics’ natural resources, with benefits primarily accruing to the center.
Forced or induced cultural assimilation, aiming to dilute national identities into a deeply Russified “Soviet man.”
The political marginalization of local elites unwilling to submit unconditionally to Moscow, coupled with the promotion of Kremlin-loyal cadres.
The systematic suppression of non-Russian historical memory, particularly events like Ukraine’s Holodomor, a brutal symbol of this oppression.
Today, under Putin, Moscow continues to act as a metropolis reluctant to accept the full emancipation of its former colonies. The denial of Ukrainian national identity, portrayed as an artificial construct or an appendage of the “great Russian nation,” is not a 21st-century invention but a continuation of a structural practice dating back to the Tsarist era and refined during the Soviet period. The ongoing invasion of Ukraine, as The Wall Street Journal (2025) observes, is the most tragic and direct manifestation of this imperial pattern, now cloaked in geopolitical Russian imperialism that barely conceals its hegemonic ambitions.
V. Conclusion: Russian Nationalism as Systemic Continuity
Vladimir Putin’s Russia is not a radical break from the Soviet past but, in many fundamental ways, its heir. It has discarded communism as an economic system and official doctrine but absorbed and refined its vast repressive apparatus, entrenched autocratic centralism, and, most crucially, its sophisticated instrumentalization of Russian nationalism as the ideological glue of the state.
Russian nationalism first covertly colonized Soviet communism, draining its original internationalist content. Today, that same nationalism, exalted and reconfigured, serves as the cement binding the ruins of the Soviet empire under a new authoritarian and nationalist guise, with a clear ambition to reassert power on the global stage. Putin is neither merely a new tsar nor a revived general secretary: he is, perhaps, a postmodern, pragmatic synthesis of both archetypes. His regime has sublimated nationalism, transforming it into a multifunctional tool for internal control, external power projection, and symbolic cohesion for a society still seeking its place in the world after the convulsions of the 20th century. As The Times (London, 2025) recently editorialized, “Understanding this complex genealogy is essential to deciphering the levers of power in today’s Russia and its implications for the global order.” This consolidated national-imperial autocracy, with deep Soviet roots and a carefully woven Slavic-Orthodox veneer, shapes both domestic legitimacy and international ambition in a world increasingly wary of its intentions.